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Abstract
Game theory has been widely applied to many areas including economics, biology and social sciences.
However, it is still challenging to quantify the global stability and global dynamics of the game theory.
We developed a landscape and flux framework to quantify the global stability and global dynamics of the
game theory. As an example, we investigated the models of three-strategy games: a special replicator-
mutator game, the repeated prison dilemma model. In this model, one stable state, two stable states and
limit cycle can emerge under different parameters. The repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma system has Hopf
bifurcation transitions from one stable state to limit cycle state, and then to another one stable state
or two stable states, or vice versa. We explored the global stability of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
system and the kinetic paths between the basins of attractor. The paths are irreversible due to the
non-zero flux. One can explain the game for Peace and War.
Introduction
Game theory is the study of conflict and cooperative strategic decision making between intelligent rational
decision-makers. Game theory has widely been recognized to be important and useful in many fields such
as economics, political science, psychology, computer science, biology etc. The game dynamics usually
can converge to stable point attractors [1, 2]. However, a more complex non-equilibrium dynamics can
lead to stable oscillations. The cyclical oscillations have been explored in the game-theoretical models
of price dispersion [3] and in the side-blotched lizard with three color morphs of males signalling three
different alternative reproductive strategies(Uta stansburiana) experimentally [4]. Understanding the
dynamical and global stability of the game theory is one of the greatest challenges at present. Even
though numerous studies have been explored over the past decades with great advances in this field,
there are still several unsolved problems.
The evolutionary stability was first introduced and formulated by Maynard Smith and Price in 1973
[5, 6]. They first applied the game theoretical ideas to evolutionary biology and population dynamics.
This is the birth of evolutionary game theory which studies the behaviors of the large populations [2].
Evolutionary population game is a general framework for exploring the strategic interactions among large
populations of agents. The agents play pure strategies and are with random matching. The dynamics of
biological structure and population behaviors often has high stability and robustness. Thus, one of the
central problem is to explore the stability and robustness of the evolutionary game theory in a population.
The significant applications of game theory are on modeling and analyzing varieties of human and animal
behaviors we observed around us. The game theory systems are complex and involve different interactions
among the agents. The strategic interactions can lead to complex dynamics.
There have been many studies on the stability of game theory. However, most of the investigations
are focused on the local stability, which are the analyses to uncover whether a system will restore to
equilibrium under a small disturbance. An evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy or mixed
strategy that all members play, and is resistent to invasions by a few mutants playing a different strategy
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2in a population. But the system can move far from its ESS equilibrium since the it is under continuous
small perturbations from the mutations and events by chance [7]. Thus, the ESS can not guarantee the
global stability of the system. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a result in a non-cooperative game with each
player assumed to know the other players’ equilibrium strategy and the agents get nothing by altering
only their own strategy. The NE can be stable or unstable. It is very similar to an ESS [6] . The famous
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and Nash equilibrium (NE) are insufficient conditions of dynamic
stability since they are only local criterion under small fuctuations [7]. It is often not clear whether the
system will reach equilibrium from an arbitrary initial state or whether the system can be switched from
one locally stable state to another. These dynamical issues depend on the global structure of the system.
Furthermore, the link between the global characterization and the dynamics of the game theory systems
is often missing. The global stability of the game theory is thus still challenging at present.
Deterministic population dynamics can only describe the average dynamics of the system. Both
external and intrinsic fluctuations are unavoidable [8]. The environmental fluctuations can influence
the behaviors of population while the intrinsic fluctuations originated from mutations or random errors
in implementations can not be neglected in finite population. They may play an essential role in the
dynamics of the system. The analysis of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics was first studied by
Foster and Young in 1990 [7]. They defined the stochastic stability and the stochastically stable set
which is a set of stochastically stable equilibrium states when the fluctuations tend to zero slowly in
the long run(so called long-run equilibria) [7, 9]. The stable state sets are obtained by the potential
theory [7]. However, the general approach for exploring the global stability of the game theory systems
are still missing.
The researchers have also explored the game theory system with the method of Lyapunov function
which can be used to study the global stability. Some analytical Lyapunov functions were found for
certain highly simplified game theory models [2]. However, it is still challenging to find the Lyapunov
function of the game theory models with complex dynamics. In this study, we will provide a general
approach to investigate the Lyapunov function. We will also develop a general framework for exploring
the robustness and global stability of the game theory systems.
Besides uncovering the dynamics of the simple convergent stable states, exploring the mechanism of
the non-convergent behavior is even more important for understanding the nature of the dynamics for
evolutionary game theory. This is because certain more complicated behaviors such as oscillations and
chaos often emerge in human interaction [10]. The most well known model of evolutionary dynamics
is the replicator model. The simplest replicator dynamics of three-strategy games can only give certain
behaviors: sinks, sources and saddles [10, 11] or heteroclinic cycles for Rock-Paper-Scissors(RPS) game.
However, the replicator dynamics can not provide a stable limit cycle behavior [10,12]. Lyapunov stable
equilibria of the replicator dynamics are Nash equilibria and ESS of the replicator dynamics are asymp-
totically stable [13, 14]. Mutation effects can be included in order to promote the chances that players
change from one strategy to another spontaneously. The selection and mutation model has been explored
in population genetics for decades. The replicator-mutator dynamics played a key role in evolutionary
theory [6, 13–16].
In this study, we will develop a landscape and flux framework to quantify the global stability and
robustness of evolutionary game theory. Conventional stability analysis of game theory (Nash equilibrium
and ESS) give a static view and local description. In this study, we give a dynamical view and global
quantification of the stability. We found the flux is additional force not present in the conventional game
theory in determining the global dynamics. Both landscape and flux determines the dynamics. The
landscape topography and kinetic transitions as well as optimal kinetic paths from one basin to another
(local stable strategy) provide the global quantification of the strategy switching process and functional
stability. That is not present in the current game theory. The global stability can be systematically
studied in the landscape and flux approach via Lyapunov functions while these are only found for special
cases (one dimensional case) in the current game theory. In the current evolutional game theory, the
3driving forces has never been decomposed. The landscape and flux theory provides a framework to quan-
tify each component of the driving force and dictate the evolutionary game dynamics. We also explored
non-equilibrium thermodynamics which is not covered in the current repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
or evolutionary game theory.
We use a replicator-mutator model of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma [13, 17–19] as an example
to illustrate our general theory. There are three interaction strategies in this model: always cooperate
simplified by ALLC, always defect simplified by ALLD, and tit-for-tat simplified by TFT . Figure 1
shows the schematic of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. ALLD players are the first winners for random
initial strategies in the population. Then small numbers of ALLC players will invade and replace strategy
ALLD. The consideration of mutation effect can lead to the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma to a stable limit
cycle state rather than a ALLD dominant state since ALLD is the only strict Nash equilibrium. The
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma existed sustained oscillations among ALLD, ALLC and TFT strategies. We
developed a landscape and flux landscape theory [20–26] to explore the global behavior and dynamics of
the evolutionary game theory of the Prisoner’s Dilemma system. We quantified the population landscape
related to the steady state probability distribution which determine the global behavior. The landscape
has the shape of attractor basins for multi-stability and Mexican hat for limit cycle oscillations. We also
found that the intrinsic landscape with a Lyapunov function property for the the repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game model can quantify the global stability. The non-equilibrium evolutionary game theory
dynamics for repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is found to be determined by both the landscape and the
curl flux. The curl probability flux can lead to the break down of the detailed balance and drive the
stable periodical oscillation flow along the limit cycle ring [20]. We explored the stability and robustness
of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game against the mutation rate and the pay-off matrix. The pathways
between basins are quantified by the path integral method and irreversible due to the non-zero flux.
Models and Results
The landscape and flux quantification for game theory
The landscape and flux theory as well as non-equilibrium thermodynamics for the general dynamical
systems have been explored in several different fields [?,20–26]. They can be used to address the issues of
global stability, function, robustness for dynamical systems. Here, we will apply the landscape and flux
theory to quantify the global stability and robustness of the game theory.
Due to intrinsic and extrinsic fluctuations [8], the deterministic dynamics described by a set of ordi-
nary differential equations are supplemented with the additional fluctuation force. Then the stochastic
dynamics emerges [27, 28]: dx = F(x)dt + g · dW, where x is the state vector representing the popu-
lation or species density in game dynamics), F(x) is the driving force, W coupled through the matrix
g represents an independent Wiener process. The evolution of the stochastic dynamics is thus more
appropriately described by probability evolution. The probability distribution P (x, t) can be obtained
by solving the corresponding Fokker-Planck equation [27,28]:
∂P/∂t = −∇ · J = −∇ · [FP − (1/2)∇ · ((g · gT)P )]. (1)
We set DD = (1/2)(g·gT), where D is a constant describing the scale of the fluctuations and D represents
the anisotropy diffusion matrix of the fluctuations.
The game process can be treated as a binomial sampling process: N players play the games as a sample
of 2N players with different strategy from a large population of players. So we can set Dij = xi(δij −xj)
coming from the sampling nature of the game which is widely used in evolutionary population dynamics
[24].
The matrix Dij has some special properties. The first is
(∇ ·D)i = 1− nxi, (2)
4so that
∑n
i=1(∇ ·D)i = 0. The second is its inverse matrix is known to have the property [24]:
(D−1 · F)i = Fi/xi − Fn/xn, (3)
where Fn = −
∑n−1
i=1 Fi.
The steady state probability distribution Pss can be derived from the long time limit of the Fokker-
Planck equation ∂P/∂t = 0. The steady state probability flux is defined as Jss = FPss−D∇·(DPss). The
steady state flux is divergent free and therefore a rotational curl. The population landscape is defined as
U = −lnPss. The deterministic driving force F can be decomposed as: F = −DD·∇U+Jss/Pss+D∇·D.
The flux Jss = 0 denotes the equilibrium with detailed balance while the flux Jss 6= 0 denotes the non-
equilibrium with non-zero flux breaking the detailed balance. The dynamics of the equilibrium system is
determined only by the population landscape gradient. The dynamics of the non-equilibrium system is
determined by both the potential landscape and non-zero flux. [20]
The intrinsic landscape at the zero fluctuation limit has the the property of Lyapunov function [24,
29–31] and can be used to quantify the global stability and function of the game theory systems. The
intrinsic landscape φ0 follows the Hamilton - Jacobi equation as below [23,24,32]:
F · ∇φ0 +∇φ0 ·D · ∇φ0 = 0. (4)
and
dφ
dt
= F · ∇φ0 = −∇φ0 ·D · ∇φ0 ≤ 0 (5)
The intrinsic landscape φ0 is a Lyapunov function monotonously decreasing along a deterministic path
[24, 32]. The intrinsic landscape φ0 quantifies the global stability for general dynamical systems either
with or without detailed balance and can be solved by the level set method [33].
The steady state probability distribution Pss and the population landscape U have the relationship
of Pss(N) = exp(−U)/Z. Z is the partition function Z =
∫
exp(−U)dN. The entropy of the non-
equilibrium game system is given as [24, 34–37]: S = − ∫ P (N, t)lnP (N, t)dN, and the energy is given
as: E = D
∫
UP (N, t)dN = −D ∫ ln[ZPss]P (N, t)dN. The nonequilibrium free energy F is thus:
F = E −DS = D(
∫
P ln(P/Pss) dN− lnZ). (6)
The nonequilibrium free energy as the combination of energy and entropy reflects the first law of non-
equilibrium thermodynamics. The free energy decreases in time monotonically while reaching its mini-
mum value, F = −DlnZ [24, 34–37]. This reflects the second law of non-equilibrium thermodynamics.
The free energy as a Lypunov functional can be used to explore the global stability of stochastic non-
equilibrium systems with finite fluctuations.
The repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game theory model with mutations
We consider a finite set of pure strategies for a large finite population of players with random matching.
Each player chooses a pure strategy from the strategy set S = 1, 2, 3, ..., n [1,2]. The aggregated behaviors
of these players are described by a population state x, with xi representing the proportion of players
choosing pure strategy Si. And xi represents the frequency of strategy Si. A is the payoff matrix. The
scalar Ai(x) represents the payoff to strategy Si when the population state is x. Since the sum of all
frequencies equals to 1:
∑
i xi = 1, the system becomes n − 1 dimensional. The average fitness (pay-
off) f¯ is obtained as f¯ = xAx by the members of the population. The fitness denotes the individual’s
evolutionary success [9]. In the game theory, the payoff of the game is the fitness. The fitness to strategy
i becomes fi = (Ax)i [1, 2]. In this study, we use simple three-strategy game which can be reduced to
two dimensional. Here we will introduce the replicator-mutator dynamics.
5Figure 1. The schematic of repeated prisoner’s dilemma. ALLC is short for always cooperate. ALLD
is short for always defect. TFT is short for tit-for-tat.
The players in standard Prisoner’s Dilemma model play either cooperate strategy or defect strategy
simultaneously [38]. The players earn their payoff depending on their choices of strategies. The mutually
aided cooperators will acquire the reward R when the cooperators are encountered. The defectors will
obtain a punishment Pu when the defectors are encountered. A cooperator acquires a sucker payoff
S and a defector acquires a temptation payoff T when they encountered [18, 39]. Prisoner’s Dilemma
should satisfy the relationship T > R > Pu > S. Mutual cooperative strategy is better than mutual
defective strategy, so the reward R should be greater than the punishment Pu. Defectors gain more
temptation T than the reward R that cooperators gain if the partner cooperates. The defectors will loose
less punishment Pu than the sucker S lost by cooperators if the partner defects.
We explored a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma model with mutation using replicator dynamics. Replica-
tor dynamics was introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978) [40], which is the best-known dynamics in the
models of biological evolution. The mean dynamic evolutionary equation is replicator dynamics shown
as below [1,2]
dxi
dt
= xi(fi − f¯) = xi((Ax)i − xAx) (7)
In the presence of mutations, ALLD and ALLC players may all mutate to strategy TFT . Therefore,
more players choose TFT strategy, and will help ALLC players to win the game. Then the ALLD
will emerge again to obtain more profit [6]. This dynamics can be used to quantify the peace and war
oscillation [6].
We define the probability that agents with strategy Si mutating to strategy Sj as qij , which satisfies∑
j qij = 1. Thus, mutation matrix is Q = [qij ] [6, 13, 17, 19]. The elements of the mutation matrix Q
are defined in terms of a mutation parameter µ satisfying 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. The mutation µ denotes the error
probability in the process of replication. µ = 0 denotes no mutation with perfect replication while µ = 1
denotes the mutation entirely. The replicator-mutator dynamics describes the dynamics of the population
distribution x as a result of replication driven by fitness f and mutation driven by Q [6, 15,16]:
6dxi
dt
=
N∑
j=1
xifi(x)qji − xif¯ (8)
This equation is the quasispecies equation proposed by Manfred Eigen and Peter Schuster [?]. We set
a uniform probability of mutation from one strategy to another strategy with qii = 1− 2µ, qij = µ, then
the matrix Q is shown as follows [6, 15,16]:
Q =
 1− 2µ µ µµ 1− 2µ µ
µ µ 1− 2µ
 (9)
The x1,x2,x3 are the fractions of the population choosing the strategies ALLD,TFT ,ALLC, respec-
tively. We substitute Q into Eq.8, then replicator-mutator dynamics are shown as the following simplified
equations [18,39]:
dx1/dt = x1(f1 − f¯) + µ(−2x1f1 + x2f2 + x3f3)
dx2/dt = x2(f2 − f¯) + µ(−2x2f2 + x1f1 + x3f3)
dx3/dt = x3(f3 − f¯) + µ(−2x3f3 + x1f1 + x2f2) (10)
We considered the players playing with infinite number of rounds. So in these limits, the average
payoff matrix with cost are shown as [17,18] for the strategies ALLD,TFT ,ALLC:
A =
 Pu Pu TPu− c R− c R− c
S R R
 (11)
TFT strategy is conditional while ALLD and ALLC strategies are unconditional. Thus, the payoff
value of strategy TFT may have a small complexity cost [17,41].
The parameters are set as: T = 5,R = 3,Pu = 1,S = 0 [6, 18, 42]. µ is the average mutation rate
between each two of three strategies. c is a complexity cost for playing TFT . Larger c represents the less
players who play the strategy TFT .
Phase diagrams, Hopf bifurcations and limit cycles in evolutionary game dy-
namics upon TFT cost changes
Figure 2 (A) shows the phase diagram which has a S shape for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with the
constant parameter µ = 0.006 and changing parameter c. There are five regions in this phase diagram.
When the cost for TFT c is smaller, the game theory system has only one stable state, which denotes
the Peace state in the peace and war game shown in Region I. As c increases, the stable state becomes
a limit cycle in Region II. Then, as c increases further, another new stable state (can be viewed as War
state) and an unstable saddle state emerge beside the limit cycle. It is a saddle-node bifurcation shown
in Region III. As cost c increases furthermore, the limit cycle diminishes and becomes an unstable state,
along with a stable state (War state) in Region IV. As cost c increases even further, there is only one
stable state (War state) in Region V.
7Figure 2. A: the phase diagram for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with the constant parameter
µ = 0.006 and changing cost parameter c. C: the entropy production rate versus parameter c. E: the
free energy versus parameter c. B: the phase diagram for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with the
constant parameter c = 0.22 and changing parameter µ. D: the entropy production rate versus
parameter µ. F: the free energy versus parameter µ. The other parameters are
T = 5,R = 3,Pu = 1,S = 0.
1. Population, intrinsic landscape and curl flux for quantifying global stability of the game
theory dynamics
By solving the Fokker-Planck diffusion equation, we obtain the steady distribution of the probability.
Thus, the population landscape of the system can be obtained as: U = −lnPSS . We solved the Hamilton-
8Jacobi equation to obtain the intrinsic landscape φ0 by the level set method [43]. Figure 3 show the 3
dimensional non-equilibrium population landscape U at the top row and intrinsic potential landscape φ0
at the bottom row as the parameter c increases, when the other parameters are set as µ = 0.006, T = 5,
R = 3, Pu = 1, S = 0. We can see the underlying population landscape and intrinsic landscape have
similar shapes in each column. The population landscape and the intrinsic landscape both have a basin
shown in Figure 3(A)(E) with small cost c = 0.1. Figure 3(B)shows the population landscape U with a
closed inhomogeneous ring valley which is not uniformly distributed, while Figure 3(F) shows that the
intrinsic landscape φ0 with Lyapunov properties has a closed homogeneous ring valley with cost c = 0.2.
The value of φ0 along this ring valley is almost a constant. As cost c = 0.24, a new basin emerged at
the right corner of the space shown in Figure 3(C)(G). It denotes the War state with larger probability
of strategy ALLD, which is a strict Nash equilibrium. Then at the cost c = 0.35, the closed ring valley
disappeared, only the stable War state basin is left shown in Figure 3(D)(H).
−∇U is the negative gradient of the population landscape while −∇φ0 is the negative gradient of
the intrinsic landscape. −∇U at the top row and −∇φ0 at the bottom row are represented by black
arrows. Jss/Pss is the steady state flux divided by steady state probability while V = Jss/Pss)|D→0 is
the intrinsic flux velocity. Jss/Pss at the top row and V at the bottom row are represented by purple
arrows. We can see the flux with purple arrows are almost orthogonal to the negative gradient of U
under the black arrows around the basins or the closed ring valley shown on the top row. The region with
higher population potentials has some disordered oriented arrows due to the lower probability and limit
of computational accuracy. The flux velocity with purple arrows are orthogonal to the negative gradient
of φ0 under black arrows at the bottom row. The landscape’s gradient force ∇U or the ∇φ0 attract the
system to the basin or the closed ring valley, while the flux drives the periodical oscillation flow or spiral
descent to the basin. It is necessary to characterize this non-equilibrium repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
with both landscape and flux.
Figure 3. The 3 dimensional population landscapes U with increasing parameter c are shown in
A,B,C,D. Purple arrows represent the flux velocity(Jss/Pss) while the black arrows represent the
negative gradient of population potential(−∇U). The 3 dimensional intrinsic energy landscapes φ0 with
increasing parameter c are shown in E,F,G,H. Purple arrows represent the intrinsic flux velocity
(V = (Jss/Pss)D→0) while the black arrows represent the negative gradient of intrinsic
potential(−∇φ0).
9Game theory systems are often non-equilibrium open systems. They exchange energy from the en-
vironments which lead to dissipation. The entropy production rate and heat dissipation rate are equal
in steady state. Thus, the entropy production rate is another global physical characterization of a non-
equilibrium system and measured by the following formula:EPR =
∫
J2/Pdx( [?,20,24,44,45]). Figure 2
(B) shows the entropy production rate (EPR) versus cost c. We can see EPR has a bell shape in Region
II and Region III with limit cycle in the system. It indicates that the limit cycle costs more energy to
maintain.
2. Rational of formation of attractor state and landscape of game dynamics
We show the 2 dimensional population landscape U for increasing parameter cost c with constant µ =
0.006 in Figure 4. Figure 4(A) shows that the population landscape U has a stable basin near the middle
of TFT axis with the cost parameter c = 0.1. When the cost parameter for TFT is small, the profit
for TFT players is more than the that with larger c. In this attractor, most players choose strategies of
ALLC and TFT . The fluxes represented by the purple arrows rotate anticlockwise around this stable
state. This state can be viewed as ”Peace” state in peace and war game. As cost parameter for TFT
increases c = 0.2, a limit cycle emerges and replaces the stable state in Figure 4(B). The population
landscape has a blue ring valley along the deterministic trajectory. More players choose TFT and ALLC
in the Peace state. As more players mutate to ALLC, a small number of ALLD players emerge. This
leads to a state with more ALLD players. As the ALLD players become more, the profit obtained from
the game becomes less. Some ALLD players convert their strategy to TFT . This makes a circle in the
state space of strategy probability. Notice that the ring valley is not homogeneous in landscape depth.
There is a deeper area on the left side of the limit cycle, which is still close to TFT axis. This indicates
that the Peace state with deeper depth is more stable than other state. The system will stay in Peace
state much longer than any other state. Figure 4(C) shows the ring valley of the oscillation expands
its amplitude in the strategy-frequency space. A stable state War emerges at the right corner of the
triangle, which is close to the ALLD → 1. The stable War state is the one where most of players choose
the ALLD strategy. We can see that the limit cycle and the stable state coexist in the strategy-frequency
space. It indicates that the system sometimes is in the limit cycle and sometimes in the stable state.
System can switch between the Peace and War attractor basins states under the fluctuations and the
mutations. When the cost for TFT increases to c = 0.24 and c = 0.25 shown in Figure 4(D)(E), the
ring valley becomes shallower and shallower while the basin of the stable War state becomes deeper
and deeper. As c increases, the profits obtained from the TFT strategy decreases in the whole game,
more players give up TFT strategy and choose ALLD strategy to earn more which lead to the more
stable and deeper War state basin. When the cost for TFT increases to c = 0.35 shown in Figure 4(F),
the oscillation ring valley disappears and the War state survives and becomes deeper and more stable.
Figure 4 also shows the flux (purple arrows) as mutation rate µ increases. We can see the fluxes has a
anticlockwise curl nature along with limit cycle. The flux is the driving force for the stable oscillation
flow.
3. Quantification of landscape topography of game dynamics
We quantify the landscape topography and show barrier heights versus cost c with mutation parameter
µ = 0.006 in Figure 5(A). We first set Uo as the value of population landscape U at the maximum
point at the center of the limit cycle. Us is the value of population landscape U at the saddle point
between the limit cycle valley and the stable War state basin. Up is the minimum value of population
landscape U along the limit cycle near the y axis, which is the Peace state. Uw is the minimum value of
population landscape U at the stable War state. We set the barrier height for the oscillation ring valley
as ∆ULimit = Uo−Up, the barrier height between the saddle point and the oscillation as ∆Usp = Us−Up
and the barrier height between the saddle point and the War stable state as ∆Usw = Us − Uw. We
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Figure 4. The 2 dimensional population landscape U with different parameter c and constant
parameter µ = 0.006. A:c = 0.1, B:c = 0.2, C:c = 0.22, D:c = 0.24, E:c = 0.25, F:c = 0.35. The purple
arrows represent the flux.
can see as the cost c increases, barrier height ∆Usw increases, barrier height ∆Usp decreases first then
increases, barrier height ∆ULimit increases first then decreases. It indicates that the oscillation itself
relative to the maximum point in the center of limit cycle becomes more stable first then becomes less
stable. It has a turning point during the process of c increasing. The War state become more robust,
and the barrier height from oscillation to War state ∆Usp becomes less than that of ∆Usw for larger cost
c value. This implies that the War attractor state becomes more preferred than that of oscillation, as
the cost increases further.
Phase diagrams, state switching, landscapes and fluxes upon mutations
Figure 2(B) shows the phase diagrams for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with changing parameter µ
at the constant parameter c = 0.22. There are four regions in phase diagram. When the mutation rate
µ is smaller, the system has a stable state (can be viewed as War state) in Region IV. As µ increases, a
stable state War, an unstable saddle state and the limit cycle coexist in Region III. As the mutation rate
µ increases further, the stable state and saddle point disappear after the saddle-node bifurcation. There
is only limit cycle left in Region II. As the mutation rate µ keeps on increasing, the limit cycle becomes
a stable mixed state (with moderate probability of more than 20% of the players with ALLD strategy)
in Region I. The mixed state is the combination of these three strategies. We can see energy cost EPR
shown in Figure 2(D) has a bell shape as the mutation rate µ increases when the cost c is moderate. This
is because that the state of oscillation costs more energy in the strategy probability state space while one
state cost less energy to maintain.
We can also see this process of transition in Figure 6 which shows that the population landscape U
11
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Figure 5. A: The barrier heights versus parameter c with parameter µ = 0.006. B: The barrier heights
versus parameter µ with parameter c = 0.22. Here, ∆ULimit = Uo − Up, ∆Usp = Us − Up,
∆Usw = Us − Uw. Uo is the value of population potential landscape U at the maximum point on the
swell in the center of the limit cycle. Us is the value of population potential landscape U at the saddle
point between the limit cycle valley and the stable state basin War. Up is the minimum value of
population potential landscape U along the limit cycle near the y axis, which is the Peace state. Uw is
the minimum value of population potential landscape U at the stable state War.
and the flux change with the increasing mutation rate µ at constant cost c = 0.22. Figure 5(B) shows
that ∆Usp increases and ∆Usw, ∆ULimit decrease as mutation rate µ increases. This shows that when
mutation rate is small, the limit cycle ring valley is very stable relative to its oscillation center, but has
less probability relative to the War state since the basin state War is much deeper. It indicates that
more players choose strategy ALLD, and the players do not like to mutate to the other two strategies.
This leads to more stable War state. As µ increases, the limit cycle ring valley becomes less stable
relative to its oscillation center, but becomes more stable relative to the War state. Eventually a much
stable state Peace emerges. The state War becomes shallower and less stable, and finally diminishes as
increasing µ.
Phase diagrams, state switching, landscapes and fluxes upon temptation payoff
Figure 7(A) shows the phase diagram for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with the constant parameters
µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, R = 3.0, Pu = 1.0, S = 0.0 and changing parameter T . T is the temptation payoff
earns by the defector while the cooperator gets sucker payoff S. There are three regions in this phase
diagram. When the temptation T is smaller, the game theory system has two stable states which can
denote Peace and War in the peace and war game shown in Region left V. As the temptation T increases,
a limit cycle emerges from the coexistence of Peace and War states in Region III. As the temptation T
increases further, the limit cycle diminishes and becomes a stable mixed state, along with a stable state
(War state) at the right of Region V. We can see EPR shown in Figure 7(D) also has a bell shape as
the temptation T increases. This also implies that limit cycle state cost more energy to maintain.
We show that the population landcapes U and the flux change with the increasing temptation T of
payoff matrix (which denotes a defector acquires a temptation payoff T when they encountered coop-
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Figure 6. The flux (purple arrows) and the gradient of the population landscape (black arrows) on the
population potential landscape U with different parameter µ and constant parameter c = 0.22.
A:µ = 0.002, B:µ = 0.003, C:µ = 0.004, D:µ = 0.006, E:µ = 0.008, F:µ = 0.012.
erators) as shown in Figure 8. The system has two stable states when temptation is very small T = 3
where the relationship T > R should hold in Figure 8(A). The system covers a large area of state space
for limit cycle valley, a Peace state and a War state. We can see the basin of Peace state is very stable
and deeper while the War state is much shallower and less stable. This illustrates majority of players
choose the cooperation ALLC or TFT strategy which leads to more stable Peace state, rather than de-
fection strategy ALLD when the temptation is less. Defection can not earn more profits. As temptation
increases, the Peace state is unstable and becomes a limit cycle state. The limit cycle state adopts the
mixed strategy TFT and ALLD. The limit cycle valley representing the Peace state becomes shallower
while the stable War state becomes more stable shown in Figure 8(B)(C)(D). When the temptation for
this game increases even further, more and more player choose defection strategy ALLD to earn more
profits rather than strategy ALLC. This is because more temptation from the defection strategy can
lead to more stable War state.
Phase diagrams, state switching, landscapes and fluxes upon cooperation re-
ward
Figure 7(B) shows the phase diagram for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with the constant parameter
µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, T = 5.0, Pu = 1.0, S = 0.0 and changes in parameter R. The element R of payoff
matrix denotes the reward that cooperators will acquire from the mutual aid when the cooperators
encountered. The value of reward R should satisfy R > (T +S)/2. If this relationship is not satisfied, the
agreement of alternate cooperation and defection will earn more payoff than that of pure cooperation in a
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game [6]. There are three regions in this phase diagram. When the reward
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Figure 7. The phase diagrams for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with changing parameter T (A) R
(B), Pu (C). The entropy production rate versus parameter T (D), R (E), Pu (F). The free energies
versus parameter T (G), R (H), Pu (I). The other parameters are S = 0,µ = 0.006,c = 0.22
R is smaller, a limit cycle and the stable War state coexists in Region III. As the reward R increases,
the War state disappears after the saddle-node bifurcation and the limit cycle is left in Region II. As
the reward R increases further, the limit cycle diminishes and a stable Peace state emerges in Region I.
Figure 7(E) also shows EPR versus reward R, which implies that the limit cycle state costs more energy
while one stable state costs less energy.
Figure 9 shows the population landscape U with increasing cooperation R. The system has one deep
stable War state and a shallower limit cycle ring valley for smaller parameter R = 2.5, since the reward
for cooperation strategy is much less. The majority players choose the defection strategy leading to the
War state shown in Figure 9(A). When reward R = 3 increases, a limit cycle valley becomes deeper and
stable while the War state becomes shallower and less stable as shown in Figure 9(B). It shows that
more and more players prefer the strategy ALLC rather than strategy ALLD since more reward can be
obtained from cooperation. As reward R increases further, the limit cycle valley becomes deeper, and the
War state vanishes shown in Figure 9C. As reward R increases even further, the limit cycle ring valley
shrinks into a stable Peace state shown in Figure 9D. The majority players choose cooperation strategy.
It is because more reward from the cooperation strategy can lead to more stable Peace state. It turns
out that more reward from cooperation leads to Peace with win-win outcome.
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Figure 8. The population landscape U with different parameter T and the constant parameters
µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, R = 3, Pu = 1.0, S = 0.0.
Phase diagrams, state switching, landscapes and fluxes upon defector punish-
ment
Figure 7(C) shows the phase diagram for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with the constant parameter
µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, T = 5.0, R = 3.0, S = 0.0 and changes in parameter Pu. The element Pu of payoff
matrix denotes that the defectors obtain a punishment Pu when the defectors are encountered. The
value of punishment Pu should satisfy R > Pu > S [6]. There are five regions in this phase diagram.
When the punishment Pu is smaller, only the stable War state exists in Region I on the left. As the
punishment Pu increases, two unstable states emerge by the saddle-node bifurcation in Region IV. As
the punishment Pu increases further, a limit cycle emerges and coexists with the stable state War in
Region III; as the punishment Pu increases even further, the limit cycle diminishes and a stable Peace
state coexists with stable War state in Region V. As the punishment Pu approaches to 3, the stable
Peace state diminishes after the saddle-node bifurcation, and the stable War state is left in Region I on
the right. Figure 7(F) also shows EPR versus punishment Pu, which shows that the system with limit
cycle dissipates more energy.
Figure 10 shows the population landscape U with increasing element Pu of payoff matrix. When
punishment Pu is small representing that the defector can earn less from the game, almost all players
choose strategy ALLD shown in Figure 10(A). ALLD is the only strict Nash solution and the only
evolutionary stable strategy. And when the punishment (Pu = 0.3) is small, the value of the first
element in the left column of the payoff matrix for ALLD is Pu while the second of that for TFT is
Pu − c = 0.08. Thus the fitness for ALLD is much higher than that of TFT , and that of ALLC (The
sucker’s payoff S = 0). This illustrates that more and more players give up ALLD since the profits of
TFT players are catching up with that of ALLD players when they both encounter the ALLD players.
As punishment Pu increases, a shallow limit cycle valley for parameter Pu = 0.5 emerges accompanied
with the stable War state shown in Figure 10(B). When punishment Pu increases further, the limit cycle
valley shrinks its size but becomes deeper and more stable while the War state becomes shallower and
less stable. This is shown in Figure 10(C)(D)(E). Then the limit cycle ring valley shrinks to a stable
Peace state where more players choose TFT strategy as shown in Figure 10(F)(G)(H). It shows that
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Figure 9. The population landscape U with different parameter R and the constant parameters
µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, T = 5, Pu = 1.0, S = 0.0.
the Peace state becomes more stable first and then loses its stability while the War state becomes more
stable as punishment Pu increases. It demonstrates that the punishment Pu has an optimal value to
lead to a more stable Peace state. At last, when the value of punishment Pu is approaching to the value
of reward R, the stable Peace state diminishes and the stable War state is left. This shows that when
the punishment Pu and the reward R are almost the same, ALLD is dominant than that of TFT since
ALLD is the only strict Nash solution and the evolutionary stable state. These results show that the
strategy ALLD is a dominant strategy and has an advantage for selection.
We explored the free energy versus the parameters of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma model in Figure
2(E) (the free energy versus cost c), Figure 2(F) (the free energy versus the mutation rate µ), Figure 7(G)
(the free energy versus temptation T ), Figure 7(H) (the free energy versus reward R), Figure 7(I) (the free
energy versus punishment Pu). We can see this five free energy profiles have some similarity that each
has the opposite tendency with that of the corresponding EPR. These free energies link to the different
phases and phase transitions. The first derivative of the free energies have discontinuous at the transition
points from a stable state to a limit cycle oscillation state and vice versa. It implies non-equilibrium
thermodynamic phase transition has certain similarities as that of the equilibrium statistical mechanics.
Free energy profiles can manifest the phase transitions and be used to explore the global stability and
robustness of the game system.
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Figure 10. The population landscape U with different parameter Pu and the constant parameters
µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, T = 5, R = 3, S = 0.0.
Kinetic speed and optimal paths of switching between two stable states
We explored the escape time for the evolutionary game system. We used the following formula to solve
the escape time τ : F ·∇τ+D ·∇2τ = −1 [27]. The escape time can be viewed the average time spent for a
system from one state to another [24]. We can set the mean first passage time (MFPT) τpw representing
the MFPT from Peace state to War state and τwp representing the MFPT from War state to Peace
state.
We also explored the kinetic paths of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma model. We can obtain the
relative probabilities of each path using statistics and the quantification of the path weights. Path integral
weights can be calculated by the action, which is analogous to the classical mechanical systems. The
dominant paths with the largest weights can be viewed the major pathways. The path integral formulate
is shown as [21,24]:
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P (xfinal, t,xinitial, 0) =
∫
DxExp[−
∫
dt(
1
2
∇ · F(x)
+
1
4
(dx/dt− F(x)) · 1
D(x)
· (dx/dt− F(x)))]
=
∫
DxExp[−A(x)] (12)
The above probability describes the chance of starting at the point xinitial at initial time and ending
at the point xfinal at the final time. The probability is the result of the sum of the weights from all
possible paths. A(x) is the action for each path. Each weight is exponentially related to the action which
has two contributions, one from the stochastic equation of motion for dynamics and the other is from
the variable transformation from the stochastic force to the system variable. Not all the paths contribute
equally to the weight. Due to the exponential nature, the optimal path is exponentially larger in weight
than the suboptimal ones. Therefore, we can identify the optimal path with the most probable weight.
We studied the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma model with the parameters nearby the set of µ =
0.006, c = 0.22, T = 5, R = 3, Pu = 2.4, S = 0.0 which has two stable state Peace and War. Figure
11 shows the optimal paths on the population landscape U with different diffusion coefficient D and
µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, T = 5, R = 3, Pu = 2.4, S = 0.0. We can see there are two stable states :War
and Peace on the population landscapes. The purple lines represent the paths from the War state to
Peace state. The black lines represent the paths from the Peace state to War state. The white arrows
represent the probability fluxes which guide the paths apart from the steepest descent path from the
landscape. Therefore, the optimal path from War to Peace states and the optimal path from Peace to
War states are apart from each other. Under more fluctuations (bigger diffusion coefficient D shown in
Figure 11(B)), the two paths are further apart from each other due to larger probability fluxes. We can
see the purple lines and black lines are irreversible in both two sub figures. These lines are apart from
each other due to the non-zero flux. The optimal paths are deviated from the naively expected steepest
descent paths from potential landscape. We can clearly see the fluxes have spiral shapes which show the
property of non-equilibrium system.
Figure 11. The pathways on the population potential landscape U with different diffusion coefficient
D and µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, T = 5, R = 3, Pu = 2.4, S = 0.0. The purple lines represent the paths from
the War state to Peace state. The black lines represent the paths from the Peace state to War state.
The white arrows represent the probability fluxes.
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Figure 12. The population landscape U with different parameter T and the constant parameters
µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, R = 3, Pu = 2.4, S = 0.0. The purple lines represent the paths from the War state
to Peace state. The black lines represent the paths from the Peace state to War state. The white
arrows represent the probability fluxes.
We show the population landscape U and the paths with different parameter temptation T and the
constant parameters µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, R = 3, Pu = 2.4, S = 0.0 in Figure 12. The purple lines
represent the paths from the War state to Peace state. The black lines represent the paths from the
Peace state to War state. The white arrows represent the probability fluxes. The paths are deviated
from the naively expected steepest descent paths from potential landscape, and they are irreversible.
The two paths become more closer from each other as T increases. Figure 13(A) shows the barrier
heights versus temptation T . We set ∆Usp = Usaddle −UPeace as the barrier height between state Peace
and the saddle point and ∆Usw = Usaddle − UWar as the barrier height between state War and the
saddle point, where Usaddle represents the value of landscape U at the saddle point between state Peace
and War, UPeace represents the minimum value of landscape U at state Peace, UWar represents the
minimum value of landscape U at state War. We can see that the barrier height ∆Usw increases while
the barrier height ∆Usp decreases. It means the state Peace loses stability as the state War becomes
more stable as temptation T increases. It denotes temptation guides more players to choose strategy
ALLD. The path weight denotes the probability of each route. The path probability can be obtained by
the action A(x) for Peace and War switching. We labeled Awp as the action of the dominant path from
state War to state Peace, and Apw as the action of the dominant path from state Peace to state War.
Figure 13(B)showed the logarithm of Peace to War path probability divided that of War to Peace path
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Figure 13. A: the barrier heights versus T , B: the logarithm of the ratio of the probability of
dominant path from state Peace to state War and the probability of dominant path from state War to
state Peace versus T , C: the logarithm of the escape time MFPT versus T , D: entropy production rate
versus T , E: the barrier heights versus R, F: the logarithm of the ratio of the probability of dominant
path from state Peace to state War and the probability of dominant path from state War to state
Peace versus R, G: the logarithm of the escape time MFPT versus R, H: entropy production rate
versus R, I: the barrier heights versus Pu, J: the logarithm of the ratio of the probability of dominant
path from state Peace to state War and the probability of dominant path from state War to state
Peace versus Pu, K: the logarithm of the escape time MFPT versus Pu, L: entropy production rate
versus Pu.
increases as temptation T increases. It represents that the path from state Peace to state War has more
probability than that of state War to state Peace.
We show the population landscape U and the paths with different parameter reward R and the
constant parameters µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, T = 5, Pu = 2.4, S = 0.0 in Figure 14. The paths are not
following the steepest descent paths from potential landscape. The two paths depart far away from each
other as R increases. Figure 13(E) shows the barrier height ∆Usw decreases while the barrier height ∆Usp
increases as reward R increases. Figure 13(F)showed the logarithm of Peace to War path probability
divided that of War to Peace path decreases as reward R decreases. It represents that as the reward
increases, more and more players choose strategy ALLC which guides the Peace state more state while
the War state less stable, and then the path from state War to state Peace has more probability then
opposite path.
We show the population landscape U and the paths with different parameter punishment Pu and the
constant parameters µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, T = 5, R = 3, S = 0.0 in Figure 15. The two paths are not
following the steepest descent paths from potential landscape and come closer from each other as Pu
increases. Figure 13(I)shows the barrier height ∆Usw increases while the barrier height ∆Usp increases
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Figure 14. The population landscape U with different parameter R and the constant parameters
µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, T = 5, Pu = 2.4, S = 0.0. The purple lines represent the paths from the War state
to Peace state. The black lines represent the paths from the Peace state to War state. The white
arrows represent the probability fluxes.
first and then decreases as punishment Pu increases. Figure 13(J)showed the logarithm of Peace to War
path probability divided that of War to Peace path decreases first and then increases as punishment
Pu increases. It represents that as the punishment increases, more players choose strategy ALLC and
ALLD which guides the Peace state and War state both becoming more state. As the punishment
grows bigger, the War state becomes more stable than that of state Peace. It denotes that the value of
punishment Pu has an optimal value to make more stable Peace state.
Figure 13(C)(G)(K)shows the logarithm of the MFPT increases as their corresponding barrier heights
increase corresponding to Figure 13(A)(E)(I). The logarithm of the MFPT and barrier heights have the
positive relationship as following: τ = exp(∆Ba). The average kinetic speeds of state transition along
the according paths can be measured by the 1/τ . As the barrier height becomes higher, the escape time
becomes longer and the kinetic speed becomes slower. Therefore, the state is more stable with higher
barrier height. It is more difficult to switch from one basin of attraction to another with higher barriers
between two stable states. It takes more time to transition and the kinetic speed is slower. The MFPT ,
kinetic speed and barrier height can supply the measurements of quantifying the stability of game theory
systems. And they can give more information about the dynamics of a game theory system. It also can
interpret the mechanisms of the state transition from the game theory systems.
Figure 13(D)(H)(L)shows the entropy production rate versus parameters T,R, Pu among the phase
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Figure 15. The population landscape U with different parameter Pu and the constant parameters
µ = 0.006, c = 0.22, T = 5, R = 3, S = 0.0. The purple lines represent the paths from the War state to
Peace state. The black lines represent the paths from the Peace state to War state. The white arrows
represent the probability fluxes.
rang of two stable state. We explored the linear stability of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma. The
eigenvalues of state Peace have negative real parts and two opposite number imaginary parts. It denotes
that state Peace is a stable focus which oscillates and spiral to its destiny. Stable focus will transit to
an unstable focus which is a limit cycle. The eigenvalues of state War have negative real parts and no
imaginary parts. It denotes that state War is a stable node. EPR decreased as temptation T increases,
while Peace state loses its stability and War state becomes more stability shown in Figure 13(D). EPR
increased as reward R increases, while War state loses its stability and Peace state becomes more stability
shown in Figure 13(H). EPR decreased as punishment Pu increases, while Peace state loses its stability
and War state becomes more stability shown in Figure 13(L). We can clear see that the system with
dominant Peace state will cost more entropy production rate EPR than that with dominant War state.
This is because stable focus will cost more energy. It represents that keeping the peace will consume
more energy.
22
Discussions and Conclusion
Global stability and the underlying mechanism of the dynamics are crucial for understanding the nature
of the game theory. Foster and Young presented the analysis of stochastic perturbation of evolutionary
game dynamics, defining the stability for a stochastic dynamics. It is viewed as capturing the long-run
stability of the stochastic evolutionary game dynamics rather than the evolutionary stable strategy and
the Nash equilibrium [7, 9]. They also introduced the idea of a potential function which can be used to
compute the stochastically stable set. However, their method can only obtain the potential function in
one dimension and often in equilibrium. In reality, the systems are often more complex. The evolutionary
game dynamics are general in non-equilibrium. It is difficult to obtain the analytical potential functions
to capture the stability of the evolutionary game systems in higher dimensions, since a pure gradient of
potential landscape cannot be obtained for general evolutionary game dynamics.
Many researchers tried to explore the stability of the evolutionary game systems. Some chose the
simulations of the trajectories under fluctuations [7,17]. The stability of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game can be explored by the Lyapunov function. But the Lyapunov function cannot be found easily. In
this work we develop the landscape and flux theory for quantifying the population and intrinsic landscape.
The intrinsic landscape φ0 has a Lyapunov property which can be used to explore the global stability of
the game theory systems. We obtained the numerical Lyapunov function φ0 by solving the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation and the population potential U from the Fokker-Plank diffusion equation. Thus we can
explore the global stability of the game theory system by the intrinsic landscape φ0 and the population
potential landscape U . The repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game system is a non-equilibrium system. The
underlying dynamics is determined by both the force from the gradient of the landscape and the force
from the probability flux which breaks the detailed balance. This provides a new view to explore the
game theory dynamics. In conventional evolutionary game dynamics, the flux is not considered. Here we
consider both the landscape and flux to study the evolutionary game dynamics.
The barrier height and the entropy production rate can quantify the global stability of the non-
equilibrium repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The irreversible paths are obtained by the path integral
method. The optimal paths are not along the gradient of the landscape due to the non-zero probability
flux. We also quantified the mean first passage time which can measure the kinetic speed of the dynamics
of switching from one state to another.
We have found that when the cost for TFT which reduces the values of element of TFT in payoff
matrix is small, and thus the values of payoff elements for TFT are large, the system approaches to
Peace state easily. As the cost c increases further, the system will go to the War state since the profits
from the TFT strategy is much less. We have also found that when c is small, high mutation rate will
lead to Peace state far from War state.
When c is moderate, high mutation rate will lead to a mixed strategy state which has almost the same
probability of these three strategies. It prefers the system far from War state. However, as the cost c is
larger, the system will fall into War state either with low mutation rate or high mutation rate.
We have also found that moderate intensity of punishment for defection strategy (moderate value of
parameter Pu) decreases the stability of War state. More reward for cooperation strategy (high value
of parameter R) prefers the Peace state. More temptation for defector from cooperator will prefer War
state to earn more profits using defection strategy. Thus choosing a moderate intensity of punishment for
defection strategy and increasing the intensity of reward for cooperation strategy will avoid the lasting
War state, and favor the long lasting Peace state.
The oscillations between Peace and War can be explained as: when Peace state sustains for a long
time, the population increases and the resource relatively reduces. In order to survive, the populations
fight for the resources, to get better livings. After a long war, the populations do not engage in the
production, livelihood, and fall into a long-term state of tension. When the Peace state emerges, the
population grows. The oscillations will circulate.
We provided the integral pathway method to obtain the paths between each two stable state. The
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paths between two states Peace and War are irreversible due to the non-zero flux which is the charac-
teristic for non-equilibrium system. The probability of each path also can give us the information about
stability. More stable state has less probability of the corresponding path to exit from its attraction. It
spent more time to exit from more stable state with higher barrier heights as MFPT shown, thus the
speed of transition between stable states are slower. We also obtained that the system with dominant
stable focus Peace has more EPR. It means that keeping peace will cost more energy. This method
supplied a chance for people to explore the properties of the paths and the kinetics speeds with their
according barrier heights for game theory systems.
Since the stochastic game theory dynamics is more difficult to explore analytically, we provide a
potential-flux framework to explore and quantify the stochastic game theory dynamics. The investigations
of the global stability are essential for understanding the nature and the underlying mechanisms of the
game theory dynamics. We show this in an example of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game system. This
can help the further understanding of the game theory for the real world.
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